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Summary
This paper studies multi-attribute auctions in which a buyer seeks to procure a complex
good and evaluate offers using a quasi-linear scoring rule. Suppliers have private
information about their costs, which is summarized by a multi-dimensional type. The
scoring rule reduces the multidimensional bids submitted by each supplier to a single
dimension, the score, which is used for deciding on the allocation and the resulting
contractual obligation. We exploit this idea and obtain two kinds of results. First, we
characterize the set of equilibria in quasi-linear scoring auctions with multi-dimensional
types. In particular, we show that there exists a mapping between the class of equilibria
in these scoring auctions and those in standard single object IPV auctions. Second, we
prove a new expected utility equivalence theorem for quasi-linear scoring auctions.
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E-mail: asker@fas.harvard.edu1I n t r o d u c t i o n
In many procurement situations the buyer cares about attributes other than just price when eval-
uating the desirability of contracts oﬀered by sellers. Standard non-monetary attributes include
lead time, time to completion, and various other measures of quality. Buyers have adopted several
practices for dealing with these situations. Some have recourse to fairly detailed request-for-quotes
(RFQ) that specify minimum standards that the oﬀers need to satisfy, and then evaluate the sub-
mitted bids based on price only.1 Others decide to select a small set of potential bidders and
negotiate on all the dimensions of the contract with each of them.
A third option is to combine the competition induced by the ﬁrst option with the ﬂexibility of the
second by holding a scoring auction. In a scoring auction, bidders submit oﬀers on all dimensions
of the good and the buyer uses a scoring rule to evaluate the oﬀers and select the winner. Scoring
auctions can be shown to dominate RFQs with minimum standards and the restricted negotiation,
at least from an eﬃciency standpoint.2
In this paper, we study scoring auctions that use quasi-linear scoring rules (i.e. the price enters
linearly in the ﬁnal score). The buyer cares about several (price and non price) attributes of the good
and several bidders compete for the contract. Examples of such scoring auctions include “A+B
bidding” for highway construction work in the US, where the highway procurement authorities
evaluate oﬀers on the basis of their costs as well as time to completion, weighted by a road user
cost,3 and auctions for electricity reserve supply (Bushnell and Oren, 1994; Wilson, 2002). The use
1For example, this is a format proposed by FreeMarkets (see www.freemarkets.com).
2An argument for why scoring auctions dominate RFQs with minimum standards is provided in Che (1993).
3The road user cost is the (per day) value of time lost due to construction. By 2003, 38 states in the US were using
”A+B bidding.” ”A+B bidding” is used mainly for large projects for which time is a critical factor. Typically, these
1of scoring auctions is also gaining favor in private sector procurement, with several procurement
software developers incorporating scoring capability in their auction designs.4
A key feature of our environment is that suppliers’ private information about their costs of providing
the good can be multi-dimensional. In particular, this means that the low cost supplier for the base
option is not necessarily the low cost supplier when it comes to increasing quality on some other
dimension, such as timeliness. As another example, it allows us to consider the likely situation
where ﬁrms diﬀer in their ﬁxed and variable costs of production.
Our main results are as follows. First, we prove that the multi-dimensionality of suppliers’ private
information can be reduced to a single dimension (his “pseudotype”) that is suﬃcient to characterize
the equilibrium in these auctions when the scoring rule is quasi-linear and private information is
independent across bidders (Theorem 1). This allows us to establish a correspondence between
the set of scoring auctions and the set of standard single object one dimensional IPV auction
environments (Corollary 1). The equilibrium in the scoring auction inherits the properties of the
corresponding standard IPV auction (existence and uniqueness of equilibrium, eﬃciency, ...).
Second, we prove a new expected utility theorem for the buyer when private information is multi-
dimensional and independently distributed and the scoring rule is quasi-linear (Theorem 2). The-
orem 2 generalizes the classic revenue equivalence theorems of Myerson (1981) and Riley and
Samuelson (1981). In particular, it implies that the buyer is indiﬀerent among a ﬁrst score, a
second score, an ascending (the equivalent of the Dutch format in this procurement setting) or a
represent 5-10% of the total highway construction projects in these states. See, for instance, Arizona Department of
Transport (2002) and Herbsman et al. (1995).
4In the US market, the Oracle Sourcing software (via www.oracle.com) is a good example of this. Verticalnet (via
www.verticalnet.com) also provides a scoring capability.
2descending scoring auction when bidders are symmetric in their pseudotypes.
There are several papers studying scoring auctions. Che (1993) derives a series of important results
for multi-attribute auctions when private information is one-dimensional.5 Our paper extends Che’s
results on equilibrium in scoring auctions, in several ways. First, we allow for multi-dimensional
private information. Second, while Che already exploited the idea of pseudotypes to derive an
equilibrium in the ﬁrst and second score auction, our characterization result establishes that no
other equilibria exists. Third, our characterization result allows us to prove an expected utility
equivalence theorem for all quasi-linear scoring rules, and not only the truthful one. Bushnell and
Oren (1994 and 1995) derive the scoring rule necessary for productive eﬃciency in a two dimensional
private information setting . They then implicitly exploit the suﬃcient statistics property of these
auctions to derive a symmetric equilibrium in the second score auction. Our Theorem 1 and
Corollary 1 establish that the symmetric equilibrium they derive is indeed the only one.
On a more general level, this paper provides a precise exposition of the applicability of the suﬃcient
statistics approach leveraged by these papers. We show why the use of a suﬃcient statistic is
appropriate in these environments. We are also able to outline the limitations of the approach. In
particular we show that, when the scoring rule is not quasi-linear, a suﬃcient statistic approach will
not work. Similarly, our characterization result makes clear why independence of signals is critical.
Most importantly, we show that the suﬃcient statistic approach is a powerful and simple tool for
the analysis of equilibrium in a far richer class of scoring auction environments than previously
investigated, including when private information is multi-dimensional.
Some recent papers study other auction environments with multi-dimensional private information.
5Branco (1997) extends Che’s paper to aﬃliated costs for the suppliers.
3Multi-dimensional private information creates much more complex incentive situations, including
the non-existence of equilibria (Jackson, 1999) or the loss of monotonicity of these equilibria (Reny
and Zamir, 2002). In our case, we are able to reduce the relevant dimensionality of private infor-
mation to one, by exploiting the one-dimensionality of the allocation rule and the independence
of types across bidders. We can then appeal to the analogy between our environment and the
standard IPV environment. A similar property (though through a much more subtle analogy to
the standard IPV model) is exploited by Che and Gale (2002) to rank revenue in auctions with
multi-dimensional types and non linear payoﬀs. In both our and Che and Gale’s approach, the
one-dimensionality of the allocation decision and the independence of private information across
bidders are necessary for reducing the dimensionality of the relevant private information. No such
reduction is possible for multi-unit auctions, or for one object auctions where private information
is not independent (see Fang and Morris, 2003, for an example).
A variant of scoring auctions are auction environments that involve the sale or purchase of multiple
items but where the auctioneer or the procurement authority cannot commit, at the time of the
auction, to the quantity sold or purchased. Examples include the sale of timber rights or the
purchase of electricity reserve supply. In these auctions, bidders also submit multi-dimensional
bids (often a ﬁxed and a variable price) which are evaluated using a scoring rule. The weight given
to the variable price is based on the auctioneer / procurement agency’s estimate. The scoring
rule is used for allocating the contract, though the ﬁnal contract often depends on the realized
quantities. This creates interesting incentive problems (see Athey and Levin, 2001 and Chao and
Wilson, 2002). We ignore these aspects in the current paper.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the model and introduces the
4notion of pseudotypes. Section 3 proves that the pseudotypes are suﬃcient statistics in our envi-
ronment, and establishes the correspondence between scoring auctions and regular IPV auctions.
Our expected utility equivalence theorem is proved in section 4. Section 5 concludes.
2M o d e l
2.1 Environment
We consider a buyer seeking to procure an indivisible good for which there are N potential suppliers.
The good is characterized by its price, p, and M ≥ 1 non monetary attributes, Q ∈ RM.
Preferences. The buyer values the good (p,Q) at v(Q) − p, where vQ > 0 and vQQ is a negative
deﬁnite matrix. Supplier i’s proﬁt from selling good (p,Q) is given by p − c(Q,θi), where θi ∈
RK,K≥ 1, is supplier i’s type. We allow suppliers to be ﬂexible with respect to the level of
non-monetary attributes they can supply.6 We assume that the marginal cost of producing each
attribute is positive, cQ > 0, and that cQQ is positive semi-deﬁnite. In particular, this allows for
costs that are independent across attributes and convex in individual attributes. We normalize the
type space by assuming that cθi > 0. Note that the buyer and the suppliers are risk neutral.
These assumptions imply that social welfare v(Q) − c(Q,θi) is strictly concave in Q. The ﬁrst
best level of non monetary attributes for each supplier, QFB(θi)=a r g m a x {v(Q) − c(Q,θi)} is
well-deﬁned and unique.
Information. Preferences are common knowledge among bidders and the buyer, with the excep-
tion of suppliers’ types, θi,i=1 ,...N, which are privately observed by each bidder. Types are
6Rezende (2003) studies an example of a procurement model with ﬁxed levels of non-monetary attributes. In our
model, the level of non-monetary attributes is determined during the auction process.
5independently distributed according to the well-behaved joint density function fi(θi) with support
on a bounded and convex subset of RK, Θi ⊂ RK. These density functions are common knowledge.
2.2 Allocation mechanism
We now introduce the scoring auction. We start with two deﬁnitions:
A scoring rule is a function S : RM+1 → R :( p,Q) → S(p,Q), that associates a score to
any potential contract between the buyer and a supplier, and represents a continuous preference
relation over the contract characteristics (p,Q). A scoring rule is quasi-linear if it can be expressed
as φ(Q) − p or any monotonic increasing function thereof. We assume that the scoring rule is
strictly increasing and concave in non monetary attributes and strictly decreasing in price.7
A scoring auction is an allocation mechanism where suppliers compete by submitting bids of the
type (p,Q) ∈ RM+1. Bids are evaluated according to a scoring rule. The winner is the bidder with
the highest score. Bidders are given scores (s1,...,s N) to deliver, where these scores are functions
of bidders’ strategies.8 A scoring auction is quasi-linear when it uses a quasi-linear scoring rule.
For example, in a ﬁrst score scoring rule, the winner must deliver a contract that generates the
7It can be shown that any other scoring rule (i.e. putting no weight or negative weight on some attributes) is
dominated from the buyer’s point of view by the truthful scoring rule, S(p,Q)=v(Q) − p.
8The fact that the resulting obligations from the auction are in terms of scores rather than contract characteristics
means that only the score of bidders’ bid matters. The (p,Q) components of the bids are not binding. While this
may appear to contradict standard practice, it does not. Indeed, contracts often recognize that suppliers may not
be able to fully commit to some levels of non-monetary attributes and therefore include penalties and rewards for
under- and over-supply of such attributes. For example, even though the resulting obligations in the US highway
construction projects using ”A+B bidding” are in terms of price and a ﬁxed time to completion, delays or faster
than planned completion are penalized / rewarded at exactly the same rates as in the scoring rule. This makes the
eﬀective resulting obligation in terms of score, instead of speciﬁc levels of price and time to completion.
6value of his winning score. In a second score scoring auction, the winner must deliver a contract
that generates the value of the second highest score submitted.
Consider supplier i with type θi who has won the contract to supply the good with score to fulﬁll
si. Supplier i will choose the good characteristics (p,Q) that maximize his proﬁt, i.e.9
max
(p,Q)
{p − c(Q,θi)} subject to φ(Q) − p = si (1)
Substituting for p into the objective function yields
max
Q





We shall call k(θi) supplier i’s pseudotype. It is the maximum level of apparent social surplus that
supplier i can generate. Bidders’ pseudotypes are well-deﬁned as soon as the scoring rule is given.
They are decreasing in types since costs are increasing in types. The set of supplier i’s possible
pseudotypes is an interval in R. The density of pseudotypes inherits the smooth properties of fi.
With this deﬁnition, supplier i’s proﬁt when he wins with probability xi and needs to deliver score
si is given by10
xi (k(θi) − si) − (1 − xi)si = xik(θi) − si (3)
9Note that if supplier i must deliver score si without winning the contract, the only way he can fullﬁll the score
is with money.
10The notation we adopt assumes that si is to be fullﬁlled whether or not the contract is won. This does not
assume that we are restricting ourselves to auction formats where bidders have obligations whether they win or not.
Instead, si can be interpreted as an expected level of obligation. The fact that in (2), the optimal choice of Q does
not depend on si makes it irrelevant when the obligation must be fullﬁlled.
7An important feature of (3) is that bidder i’s preference over contracts of the type (xi,s i) is entirely
captured by his pseudotype. Only quasi-linear scoring rules have this property. Indeed, consider a




{p − c(Q,θi)} subject to S(p,Q)=si
Let Ψ(Q,si) the price required to generate a score of si with non-monetary attributes Q (Ψ is
well-deﬁned since S is strictly decreasing in p and strictly increasing in Q; it is strictly decreasing




and his expected payoﬀ from contract (xi,s i) is given by:
u(xi,s i;θi)=xi max
Q
{Ψ(Q,si) − c(Q,θi)} − (1 − xi)si
Suppose we could organize types in equivalence classes such that all types in a given class share
the same preferences over contracts. Concretely, suppose that types θi and b θi 6= θi belong to such
a class. It must be that11
u(xi,s i;θi)=u(xi,s i;b θi) if and only if u(b xi,b si;θi)=u(b xi,b si;b θi) (4)
for all pairs of contracts (xi,s i),(b xi,b si).
Let Q(θi,s i)=a r gm a x Q{Ψ(Q,si)−c(Q,θi)}. Condition (4) requires in particular that ∂
∂siΨ(Q(θi,s i),s i)=
∂
∂siΨ(Q(b θi,s i),s i). This equality will in general not be satisﬁed for b θi 6= θi unless Ψ is separable in
11In principle, the requirement of equal preferences only entails that u(xi,s i;θi) ≥ u(b xi,b si;θi) if and only if
u(xi,s i;b θi) ≥ u(b xi,b si;b θi) for all pairs of contracts (xi,s i),(b xi,b si). The stronger requirement in (4) follows from the
normalization of utilities embodied in the assumption of risk neutrality.
8Q and si.12 In turn, this requires that the scoring rule be quasi-linear (Ψ(Q,si)=φ(Q) − si for a
quasi-linear scoring rule).
Notation: For the remainder of this paper, we adopt the following notation and conventions. The
outcome function of a scoring auction is a vector of probabilities of winning (x1,...,x N) and scores
to fulﬁll by each supplier, (s1,...,s N). (If the outcome in a given scoring auction is stochastic,
these are distributions over vectors of probabilities of winning and scores.) The arguments in
these functions are the bids submitted by all suppliers, {(pi,Q i)}N
i=1.13 Later in the paper, we
will switch to a direct revelation mechanism approach where the outcome will be a function of
suppliers’ pseudotypes, (k1,...,k N) ∈ RN. To avoid introducing too much new notation, we shall
make these the arguments of the x and s functions. Similarly, we shall also write xi(ki) to denote
the expectation of xi over the types of the other suppliers, Ek−ixi(ki,k −i). The arguments will be
spelled out whenever confusion is possible.
3A s u ﬃcient statistics result
Suppliers’ pseudotypes are suﬃcient statistics in this environment if knowing the distribution of
suppliers’ pseudotypes is all one needs in order to describe the set of possible equilibria of the auction
and evaluate the buyer’s expected payoﬀ in each case. Suppliers’ original multi-dimensional types
become redundant.
In this section, we prove that pseudotypes are suﬃcient statistics. Speciﬁcally, we show that the
sets of equilibria in the scoring auction and in a auction where bidders are constrained to submit a
bid only as a function of their pseudotypes coincide. Proving this result requires two preliminary
12Indeed, Q(θi,s i) 6= Q(b θi,s i) usually for b θi 6= θi.
13Or, more generally, in the case of dynamic formats, the strategies of the bidders.
9steps. First, we show that all equilibria of the scoring auction are outcome equivalent to an
equilibrium where suppliers are forced to submit bids only as a function of their pseudotypes. We
deﬁne two equilibria as outcome equivalent if they both lead to the same distribution of outcomes
(x1,...,x N) and (s1,...,s N). Second, we prove that equilibria in scoring auctions are essentially pure
as a function of pseudotypes.
Lemma 1: All equilibria of a quasi-linear scoring auction are outcome equivalent to an equilibrium
where bidders with the same pseudotypes adopt the same strategies.
Proof: The proof proceeds in two steps.
Step 1: If there exists an equilibrium in this game, one of them is such that bidders with
the same pseudotypes adopt the same strategy.
Consider any equilibrium (E1,...,EN) where Ei is a mapping from Θi t oad i s t r i b u t i o no v e r
(p,Q) ∈ RM+1. Then for all i, for all θi and all (p∗
i,Q ∗



















where the expression for bidder i’s expected proﬁt derives from (3). In (5), bidders’ private
information enters their objective function only through their pseudotypes. Hence, bidder
i of type θi is actually indiﬀerent among the strategies played by the other bidders with the
same pseudotype. Therefore, we can construct a new equilibrium (e E1,...,e EN), such that:
101. e Ei(θi)=e Ei(b θi) whenever k(θi)=k(b θi).
2. Deﬁne Θi(k)={θi ∈ Θi|k(θi)=k}, the set of supplier i’s types with pseudotype
equal to k. For each k in the support of bidder i’s pseudotypes, the distribution of e Ei
for a given θi ∈ Θi(k) replicates the aggregate distribution of Ei over all θi ∈ Θi(k).
By construction, the distribution of bidder i’s opponents’ strategies under this new equilib-
rium is the same as before from bidder i’s perspective. Moreover, e Ei i sab e s tr e s p o n s ef o r
bidder i. Hence it is an equilibrium. Moreover, in this equilibrium, bidders’ strategies are
only a function of their pseudotypes.
Step 2: All other equilibria are outcome equivalent to an equilibrium in which bidders bid
only according to their pseudotypes.
This follows directly from step 1 since, by construction, (e E1,...,e EN) and (E1,...,EN) lead to
t h es a m ed i s t r i b u t i o no f(p,Q) and therefore scores and outcomes. QED.
An aspect of Lemma 1 worth stressing is the role played by the assumption that types are indepen-
dent across bidders. Without it, bidders’ private information would enter their expected payoﬀ in
(5), both through their pseudotypes and through their expectations over their opponents’ types. In
that case, the argument for the outcome equivalence between all equilibria in the scoring auction
and those where suppliers are constrained to bid only according to their pseudotypes breaks down.
Lemma 1 implies that the set of possible outcomes (x1,...,x N) and (s1,...,s N) can be generated by
equilibria where suppliers bid exclusively on the basis of their pseudotypes. However, it does not
imply that nothing is lost by restricting attention to these equilibria. Outcome equivalence does
not imply utility equivalence for the buyer. To see this consider the following example.
11Consider two equally likely14 types, θi and b θi, such that k(θi)=k(b θi) and suppose that in equi-
librium, they get a diﬀerent outcome: (xi,s i) and (b xi,b si). By deﬁnition, these two types generate
expected utility fi(θi)si+fi(b θi)b si for the buyer, according to the scoring rule. However, this diﬀers
from true expected utility. To know how much expected utility the bidders generate for the buyer,
we need to know how they will satisfy their obligations. Each bidder ﬁnds the pair (p,Q) that
generates the required score in the most advantageous way for him. Let Q and b Q be the resulting
levels of non monetary attributes (they are independent of s and b s). Since the scoring rule is quasi-
linear, the total monetary transfer from the buyer to the bidders is then given by xiφ(Q) − s and
b xiφ(b Q) − b s, and the buyer’s true expected utility is given by:
fi(θi)
h
xi (v(Q) − φ(Q)) + s + b xi
³




This equilibrium is outcome-equivalent to an equilibrium where type θi pretends he is b θi and vice
versa. On the face of it, the buyer gets again utility fi(θi)(si +b si) from this equilibrium. However,
proceeding as above, we ﬁnd that his true expected utility is given by
fi(θi)
h
b xi (v(Q) − φ(Q)) + b s + xi
³




Clearly, the buyer is not indiﬀerent between these two equilibria as soon as xi 6= b xi.
The next result ensures that suppliers with the same pseudotypes receive the same equilibrium
outcome function (x,s) in any equilibrium, except possibly on a set of measure zero. This rules out
the situation described in the previous example. Lemma 2 then implies that outcome equivalent
equilibria are also utility equivalent for the buyer, up to a zero measure.
Lemma 2: All equilibrium strategies in quasi-linear scoring auctions are essentially pure, both
when expressed as a function of pseudotypes and (a fortiori) when expressed as a function of types.
14This simplifying assumption is inessential for the argument.
12Note that since the only relevant bid information for the purpose of the outcome of the auction is
the score generated by suppliers’ bids, the statement of Lemma 2 should be understood as all the
types of supplier i with the same pseudotypes submit bids generating the same outcome (xi,s i) at
equilibrium, for all i.
Proof: We ﬁrst note that if there exists a non trivial mixed strategy equilibrium (where
non trivial refers to mixing on a non zero measure of types), then, by Lemma 1, there exists
a non trivial mixed strategy equilibrium in the pseudotypes space. Therefore, we shall focus
on equilibrium strategies as a function of pseudotypes to rule out non trivial mixed strategy
equilibria.
For each pseudotype k, deﬁne xi (k) and xi (k) as the lowest and highest expected proba-
bilities of getting the contract among all the bids in the support of bidder i’s strategy when
he has pseudotype k.( l e tsi(k) and si(k) be the resulting score to satisfy). By construction,
xi (k)=xi (k) when bidder i of pseudotype k uses a pure strategy.
Deﬁne Ui(k) as supplier i’s equilibrium expected payoﬀ when he has pseudotype k. Incentive
compatibility implies that
Ui(k)=xi (k)k − si (k) ≥ xi(b k)k − si(b k)=Ui(b k)+xi(b k)(k − b k)
Ui(b k)=xi(b k)b k − si(b k) ≥ xi(k)b k − si(k)=Ui(k) − xi(k)(k − b k)
Hence xi(k)(k − b k) ≥ xi(b k)(k − b k) and xi (k) is monotonically increasing in k.T h e s a m e
argument applies to xi(k). Hence xi (k) and xi(k) are almost everywhere continuous.
A similar argument based on the IC constraint establishes that xi(k) ≥ xi(b k) for all b k<k .
Together with the continuity of these functions, this implies that xi(k)=xi(k) (and si(k)=
si(k)) almost everywhere. This rules out mixed strategy equilibria. QED
13We are now able to prove the main result of this section:
Theorem 1: The set of equilibria (mappings from Θ1×...×ΘN to (pi,Q i)N
i=1) in the unconstrained
scoring auction is the same as the set of equilibria in the scoring auction where suppliers are
constrained to bid only on the basis of their pseudotypes, except possibly on a measure zero.
Proof: Lemma 2 implies that all equilibria in the unconstrained scoring auction are equi-
libria in the constrained auction (they diﬀer at most by a measure zero). To prove that
all equilibria in the constrained auction are also equilibria in the unconstrained auction,
note that bidders’ preferences over strategies (and therefore outcomes x and s) are entirely
determined by their pseudotypes (refer to (3) if needed). Therefore, if a strategy is a best
response when a bidder is constrained to adopt a strategy based on his pseudotype, this
strategy is again a best response for all types θ consistent with that pseudotype. QED
Most theoretical analyses of scoring auctions have implicitly or explicitly taken advantage of the
suﬃcient statistics property of scoring auction to derive an equilibrium in these auctions (Che, 1993,
Bushnell and Oren, 1994 and 1995). Theorem 1 suggests that doing so does not discard any other
equilibria of interest. While this may not be totally surprising when types are one-dimensional,15
this result is not trivial for environments where types are multi-dimensional. Indeed, it means that
the richness introduced by the higher dimensionality of types has no strategic consequences for
the set of equilibria. This property is a consequence of the combination of the quasi-linear scoring
rule, the single dimensionality of the allocation decision, and the independence of types across
bidders. We cannot reduce the strategic environment to one dimensional private information if
15In the one dimensional case as in Che (1993), this is not so much a question of suﬃcient statistics (there is no
reduction of the dimensionality of private information per se) as a simple change of variables.
14any of these conditions does not hold. As argued in section 1, the quasi-linearity of the scoring
rule is necessary to be able to summarize suppliers’ preferences over contracts by a single number.
As noted after Lemma 1, independence was needed to make supplier’s beliefs independent of their
types. (Multi-unit auctions oﬀer an example of multi-dimensional allocation mechanisms where
there is no reduction of dimensionality possible.)
The next result makes the relationship between scoring auctions and standard one object auctions
even more explicit:
Corollary 1: The equilibrium in scoring auctions inherits the properties of the equilibrium in the
related single object auction where (1) bidders are risk neutral, (2) their (private) valuations for the
object correspond to the pseudotype k in the original scoring auction and are distributed accordingly,
(3) the highest bidder wins, and (4) the payment rule is determined as in the scoring auction, with
bidders’ scores being replaced by bidders’ bids.
Corollary 1 relies on the expression for suppliers’ expected payoﬀ in the direct revelation mechanism
equivalent of the scoring auction: xi(k)k−si(k). This is identical to the direct revelation mechanism
expression for bidders’ expected payoﬀ in the standard independent private values single object
auction with risk neutral bidders. For example, Corollary 1 implies that an equilibrium exists in
a wide variety of formats (e.g. ﬁrst price, second price, third price, ascending, all-pay, ...). It is
unique in the ﬁrst price scoring auction. See Krishna (2002) for a survey.
Corollary 1 has practical implications for the derivation of the equilibrium in scoring auctions.
Indeed, it forms the basis for the following simple algorithm for deriving equilibria in scoring
auctions:
(1) Given the scoring rule, derive the distribution of pseudotypes, Gi(k);
15(2) Solve for the equilibrium in the related IPV auction where valuations are distributed ac-
cording to Gi(k), bi(k);
(3) The equilibrium bid in the scoring auction is any (p,Q) such that S(p,Q)=bi(k). (The
actual (p,Q) delivered are easy to derive given bi(k) and the solution to equation (2).)
4 Expected Utility Equivalence across auction formats
In this section, we extend the Revenue Equivalence Theorem (Myerson, 1981, Riley and Samuelson,
1981) to multi-attribute environments. Theorem 2 extends a result obtained by Che (1993) on the
utility equivalence between the ﬁrst and second scoring auction when types are one-dimensional
and the scoring rule corresponds to the buyer’s true preferences, i.e. φ(Q)=v(Q).
Theorem 2 (Expected Utility Equivalence). Any two scoring auctions that:
(a) use the same quasi-linear scoring rule,
( b )u s et h es a m ea l l o c a t i o nr u l exi(ki,k −i),i=1 ,...,N,and
( c )y i e l dt h es a m ee x p e c t e dp a y o ﬀ for the lowest pseudotype ki,i=1 ,...,N.
generate the same expected utility for the buyer.
Proof: Since the buyer’s utility is quasi-linear, his expected utility from a given auction is
N X
i=1
Eki,k−i [xi (ki,k −i)ESS(ki) − Ui (ki)] =
N X
i=1
Eki [xi (ki)ESS(ki) − Ui (ki)] (6)
where ESS(ki) is the expected social surplus generated by awarding the contract to bidder
i with pseudotype ki.
16By Theorem 1, we can focus on equilibria which are only functions of pseudotypes. Incentive
compatibility implies that Ui(ki) is almost everywhere diﬀerentiable and that d
dkiUi(ki)=
xi(ki), where xi(ki) is a well-deﬁned function almost everywhere by Lemma 2. Hence, (b)
and (c) implies that Ui(k) is the same across both auctions.
Next, ﬁx ki and let (p(θi,s i),Q (θi,s i)) be the realized contract of supplier i with type
θi ∈ Θi(ki), when the score to satisfy is si. Because the scoring rule is quasi-linear, Q(θi,s i)
is only a function of the scoring rule and θi, and not of si (cf. (2)). Hence,
ESS(ki)=Eθi∈Θi(ki)[v(Q) − c(Q,θi)]
is independent of si and therefore equal across the two auctions given (a). The claim follows.
QED.
Four points are worth noting concerning this result. First, the assumption that the scoring rule is
quasi-linear is key. Without it, suppliers’ choice of product characteristics (p,Q) w o u l dd e p e n do n
the form of the resulting obligation, that is, the auction format.
Second, the proof of Theorem 2 relies on the fact that any equilibrium is essentially pure as a
function of pseudotypes (i.e. xi are functions). Without this property, expected utility equivalence
between two auctions that yield the same distribution of allocations as a function of pseudotypes
would only hold when the scoring rule corresponds to the true valuation. Indeed, in that case, the
social surplus associated with a bidder of type θi is his pseudotype ki, so EES(ki)=ki.
Third, Theorem 2 implies the standard equivalence between the ﬁr s ts c o r ea u c t i o n ,t h es e c o n d
score auction and the Dutch and English auctions when bidders are symmetric. But note that the
symmetry requirement is with respect to the distribution of pseudotypes and not the distribution
of types. In particular, some bidders can (stochastically) be stronger for one attribute and others
17for another attribute, yet, when it comes to pseudotypes, they can be symmetric.
Finally, one could prove an alternative version of Theorem 2 where (b) is replaced by the requirement
that the allocation as a function of the original types, xi(θi,θ−i), is the same, and (c) is replaced
by the requirement that the expected payoﬀ of bidders at a point on the boundary of the types
set is the same across auctions. The proof for this alternative version adapts an argument made
by Krishna and Perry (2000) in proving a payoﬀ equivalence result for allocation mechanisms with
multiple goods and multi-dimensional types. Note however that the conditions for the alternative
version are more restrictive than (b) and (c). The result is therefore weaker. In particular, if we
used that approach, we could only establish the equivalence between the ﬁrst score and the second
score auction when bidders are symmetric in the original type space.
5C o n c l u d i n g r e m a r k s
Auctions with multi-dimensional private information are notoriously tricky to analyze. In this
paper, we exploit the simple property that multi-attribute auctions with scoring rules reduce the
multi-dimensional decision problem into a one-dimensional variable, the score. This score is used
both for deciding whom to award the contract and the resulting contractual obligations of the
bidders.
We have exploited this idea in two ways. First, we have characterized the set of equilibria in scoring
auctions and have argued that a single number, the supplier’s pseudotype, is suﬃcient to describe
the equilibrium outcome in these auctions, when the scoring rule is quasi-linear and types are
independently distributed. Doing so, we have drawn on the equivalence between the reduced form
of a scoring auction and that of a standard single object IPV auction. Second, we have derived a
18new expected utility equivalence theorem for scoring auctions. Any two scoring auctions that use
the same quasi-linear scoring rule and have the same allocation rule generate the same expected
utility for the buyer, modulo one additive constant. Both results extend existing theories of scoring
auctions.
The “suﬃcient statistics approach” presented here greatly facilitates the practical analysis of ex-
isting scoring auctions since standard techniques and results of auction theory can be applied to
scoring auctions (Theorem 1 and Corollary 1). Nevertheless, it is likely to be less helpful to answer
questions about the optimal choice of a scoring rule. The reason is that the distribution of pseudo-
types is endogenous to the choice of a scoring rule. Therefore choosing the best scoring rule comes
down to maximizing the expression for the buyer’s expected utility (6), over the set of distributions
of pseudotypes compatible with a scoring rule. We are skeptical that any useful progress on this
question can be achieved using this approach. In work in progress, we adapt and extend techniques
used in the multi-dimensional screening literature to study the question of buyer optimal scheme
in multi-attributes auctions, including the question of the optimal scoring rule.
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